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Iemma: Putting the Cat Back in the Bag

PUTTING THE CAT BACK IN THE BAG: INVOLUNTARY
CONFESSIONS AND SELF-INCRIMINATION
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Guilford1
(decided June 4, 2013)
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case note addresses the distinction between voluntary
and involuntary confessions, analyzing their admissibility against defendants based on the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 Protection against officially compelled self-incrimination is
found in the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment and its
New York State equivalent.3 This case note discusses what constitutes wrongful custodial interrogation and official coercion, drawing
distinctions between voluntary confessions and involuntary confessions. This case note also examines the extent and limits of Fifth
Amendment protection offered to criminal defendants by the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona4 and its progeny. Through analyses of
both the developmental history and case law precedent behind the test
for admitting confessions, this case note determines that the holding
of the court in People v. Guilford comports with the spirit of the selfincrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, thus, affording the defendant the constitutional protection guaranteed under it.
II.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In People v. Guilford, the defendant, James E. Guilford, was

1

991 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3
U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating in pertinent part: “no person…shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”); N.Y. CONST. Art. I, §6 (stating in pertinent
part that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself”).
4
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
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taken into police custody on the evening of March 20, 2007, on the
suspicion of murdering his mistress, Sharon Nugent.5 The defendant
was read his Miranda rights and was confined in a windowless,
clock-less, sparsely furnished interrogation room.6 Aside from escorted bathroom breaks, the defendant remained in this room for forty-nine and one-half hours.7 During his interrogation, the defendant
was denied food and rest, while relay teams of investigators took periodic breaks in between rounds of questioning.8
On the evening of March 21, 2007, the defendant made the
statement, “[O]nly me, God, and Sharon know what happened to
her.”9 The following evening, the defendant stated that he would
“give everyone what they want,” so long as he could confer with the
District Attorney and have an attorney of his own present. 10 Additionally, investigators promised the defendant that he would be given
a deal for a lighter sentence if he disclosed the location of the victim’s body.11 As promised, counsel for the defendant arrived on the
evening of March 22.12 Counsel, however, was never told of how
long the interrogation had lasted up to that point.13
The defendant’s forty-nine and one half hour interrogation
ended eight hours prior to his confession.14 With his counsel present,
the defendant’s interrogation concluded at 1:30 a.m. on March 23.15
It was only at that point that the defendant was formally arrested.16
The defendant was then allowed an eight hour rest before his arraignment at 9:30 a.m. that morning.17 Two hours later, at 11:30
a.m., the defendant confessed to the murder and stated to investigators, “I killed her.”18 A later search of the location said to contain the
victim’s remains was fruitless and, subsequently, the defendant’s case

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 205.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 207-8.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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went to trial.19 Based on the confession made on March 23, the defendant was convicted of murder in Onondaga County Court.20
On appeal, the defendant argued that his confession was inadmissible because not only was his interrogation wrongful, but also
there was no “pronounced break” in time between his interrogation
and confession.21 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed, holding that the gap in time between the conclusion of the interrogation and the confession was sufficient to restore the defendant’s state of mind to that of someone who had not been
interrogated.22 After that decision, the defendant further appealed to
the New York State Court of Appeals, where the Appellate Division’s decision was reversed and a new trial was ordered in accordance with that decision.23
The defendant was in police custody for the duration of his interrogation; during this time, officials deprived the defendant of essential human needs like food and rest, thereby, placing the defendant
under the influence of official coercion and, thus, his interrogation
was wrongful.24 After it was established that a wrongful interrogation had occurred, the court decided whether the defendant’s confession was voluntary.25 To make this determination, the court considered whether the eight hours elapsed between the end of the
defendant’s interrogation and his confession was enough time to
purge his mind of the influence of the wrongful questioning.26 The
court followed New York State and federal precedent by examining
the “totality of the circumstances” leading up to the defendant’s confession.27 The court determined that the eight-hour break was insufficient to distinguish the interrogation and confession as two distinct
events.28 As a result, the court ruled that the defendant’s confession
on March 23 was inadmissible at trial because it was involuntarily
made while he was still under the influence of official coercion from

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id.
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 208.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207.
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 209-10.
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the wrongful interrogation.29
III.

ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PRECEDENT FOLLOWED BY THE
COURT
A.

Voluntariness

In reaching its decision, the court in Guilford cited the United
States Supreme Court case Ashcraft v. Tennessee.30 In Ashcraft, the
Court reasoned that interrogation techniques, like lengthy questioning
without rest for the suspect, may constitute elements of a wrongful
interrogation.31 The Court further decided that the use of these techniques by officials to bring about a confession constituted official coercion.32
In Ashcraft, the defendant was charged with the murder of his
33
wife. The facts in Ashcraft were conflicted as to the defendant’s
exact treatment during the interrogation, but it was uncontroverted
that he had been interrogated for thirty-six hours without rest.34 In
addition, there was conjecture as to whether an incriminating statement was made.35 In Ashcraft, the Court recognized that regardless
of whether a confession was made, the interrogation was wrongful
because of the length of time the interrogation continued without a
break.36 The Court held that any statements made by the defendant
were involuntary and could not be used against him.37 The court in
Guilford relied on Ashcraft in its decision, reasoning that that the defendant, like the defendant in Ashcraft, had been subjected to a
wrongful interrogation because of his forty-nine and one-half hour
interrogation without rest.38 Because the interrogation was found to
be wrongful, the court in Guilford next turned to the issue of voluntariness.

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 209.
322 U.S. 143 (1944).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 151-52.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 208.
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The “Totality of the Circumstances” Test

To determine the issue of voluntariness, the court in Guilford
turned to the United States Supreme Court case Clewis v. Texas.39
The Court found that the “totality of the circumstances” was the appropriate test to assess whether a confession made after, or during, a
wrongful interrogation was voluntary or involuntary.40 In Clewis, the
defendant was charged with murder.41 He was held for nine days and
was deprived of sufficient food, sleep, and visits from family and
counsel.42 The defendant made three confessions on three separate
days during his nine day interrogation.43 The Court reasoned that the
defendant’s interrogation was wrongful because of its length and because the defendant was not given adequate rest between the periods
of questioning.44 As a result, the Court found that the interrogation
and confession were part of one continuous ordeal for the defendant
rather than separate and distinct events.45 Given the “totality of the
circumstances,” the Court held that the defendant in Clewis was still
under the influence of official coercion when he signed his final
statement, and it was, therefore, not given voluntarily.46
The court in Guilford applied “the totality of the circumstances” test to the defendant’s confession.47 The court determined that
although the defendant had been given a chance to rest after the end
of his interrogation at 1:30 a.m., the time between then and his confession at 11:30 a.m. was not sufficient to distinguish the two events
from one another.48 In making that decision, the court considered the
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s previous forty-nine and
one-half hour interrogation.49 The court reasoned that given the
length of his prior interrogation, the eight hour break was inadequate
to purge the influence of official coercion from the defendant’s mind
39

386 U.S. 707 (1967).
Id. at 708; see Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957) (holding the “totality of the
circumstances” must be assessed to reach a determination of the voluntariness of a confession).
41
Clewis, 386 U.S. at 707.
42
Id. at 709-10.
43
Id. at 710.
44
Id. at 711.
45
Id.
46
Clewis, 386 U.S. at 711.
47
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 209.
48
Id. at 207.
49
Id. at 208.
40
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at the time of his confession.50 The court reasoned that “the break”
allotted to the defendant may have further weakened his mental condition by prolonging his time in custody.51
The United States Supreme Court offered a different view in
Oregon v. Elstad.52 In Elstad, the Court held that absent actual coercion, i.e., physical compulsion, late Miranda warnings are sufficient
to dissipate the influence of a prior wrongful interrogation and subsequent confession.53 However, the facts of Guilford were distinguished from Elstad by the court.54
The defendant in Elstad confessed at his home before he had
been formally arrested or given his Miranda rights.55 It was only later, at the sheriff’s headquarters, that Miranda rights were administered.56 Afterwards, a second confession was given.57 The Court
held that the first confession did not adversely affect the defendant’s
mind so as to render the second confession involuntary because there
was never any actual coercion.58 In Guilford, the defendant was subjected to actual coercion and was given a prompt Miranda warning.59
In contrast to Elstad, the court in Guilford held that given the totality
of the circumstances, these factors did not weigh as heavily and were
deemed inadequate to dissipate the influence of the wrongful interrogation.60
C.

Miranda’s Limits

The Court in Miranda explained that one of the safeguards to
a defendant’s right against self-incrimination was the presence of
counsel.61 Based on that rationale, any confession made in the pres50

Id. at 209.
Id.
52
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
53
Id. at 311-12.
54
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206.
55
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 311-12; see United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947) (stating that “after
an accused has once ‘let the cat out of the bag’ by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.”).
59
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206.
60
Id. at 210.
61
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.
51
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ence of counsel would be considered voluntary. In Guilford, the
court decided that the presence of counsel did not “neutraliz[e] the
effects of extensive coercive interrogation.”62 The court came to its
conclusion, in part, because investigators had “made a deal” with the
defendant to disclose the location of the victim’s body in exchange
for allowing him the assistance of counsel.63 The court reasoned that
when the defendant gave his confession, he was influenced by the coercive deal made by investigators.64 Further influencing the court’s
decision, counsel for the defendant was appointed well after his interrogation had been underway.65 Counsel was not fully aware of the
duration of the defendant’s interrogation and was mistrusted by the
defendant; thus, based on Miranda, the defendant’s confession could
not be considered voluntary.66
IV.

ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK PRECEDENT FOLLOWED BY THE
COURT
A.

Chapple-Bethea Doctrine

The court in Guilford applied the New York State ChappleBethea Doctrine in its analysis. 67 This doctrine was forged out of the
consolidation of the holdings of two New York Court of Appeals
cases: People v. Chapple68 and People v. Bethea.69 In Chapple, the
court reasoned that the coercive effects of a wrongful interrogation
must be neutralized in the mind of the defendant before he is able to
give a voluntary confession.70 The court decided that in order for a
wrongful interrogation’s influence to wear off, there must be a “pronounced break” between questioning and confession.71 The defendant in Chapple was walking alongside a highway at night when he
was approached and questioned by a police officer regarding a recent
62

Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 210.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206.
68
341 N.E.2d 243 (N.Y. 1975).
69
493 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1986).
70
Chapple, 341 N.E.2d at 245-46; see People v. Paulman, 833 N.E.2d 239, 245 (N.Y.
2005) (finding that the defendant’s confession was voluntary because he was not in custody
at the time nor were his statements coaxed through wrongful means by the authorities).
71
Chapple, 341 N.E.2d at 245-46.
63
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burglary.72 He was taken to the scene of the burglary and confessed
to the crime.73 The defendant was then immediately brought to the
police station, read his rights and reiterated his false confession.74
The defendant stated that he confessed to a crime that he was innocent of out of fear because an officer threatened him with physical
force.75 The court held that, in this instance, a late Miranda warning
was an inadequate means of safeguarding the defendant’s rights.76
Because there was no “pronounced break” in time between the initial
interrogation and the second confession, the influence of the official
coercion and initial confession was not removed from the defendant’s
mind.77
Likewise, in Bethea, the court held that statements made by
the defendant while he was being transported to the police station
were made involuntarily.78 The court explained that the proximity in
time between the defendant’s initial statements in the police car, before his rights were administered, and the statements made at the station, after his rights were read, was too close to remove the influence
of the “premature” confession from his mind.79 The court in Bethea
found that there was a continuous sequence of events extending from
the arrest to the defendant’s uninformed confession in the police car
and his second informed confession in the police station.80 For that
reason, the court held that the defendant’s mind was never able to
“reset” after his first uninformed confession and, thus, both confessions were suppressed.81 In Guilford, although the Miranda warning
was given prior to the interrogation, the court reasoned that the eight
hour break in time between the coercive interrogation and the confession was not a “pronounced break.”82 As a result, there was insufficient time to remove the wrongful interrogation’s undue influence
from the defendant’s mind.83 Under the Chappel-Bethea doctrine, the
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 245.
Chapple, 341 N.E.2d at 245.
Id. at 246.
Bethea, 493 N.E.2d at 939.
Id. at 938-39.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 209.
Id.
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defendant’s confession was not considered voluntary because there
was never a “pronounced break” between his initial interrogation and
subsequent confession that could have reset his mental condition to
that of one not subjected to a wrongful confession.84
B.

Voluntariness Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

In assessing the applicable standard of proof, the court in
Guilford applied the New York State Court of Appeals case People v.
Anderson.85 In Anderson, the court held that the People bear the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of any confession made by the defendant.86 The defendant in Anderson was
held for nineteen hours while he was questioned about a friend’s
murder.87 During his interrogation, the defendant was questioned in
relays by investigators and eventually confessed after he was deprived of sleep and food.88 The defendant’s confession in Anderson
was suppressed at trial because the People failed to show that the
confession was given voluntarily.89 Another case discussed by the
court on this point was People v. Valerius.90 Here, the New York
Court of Appeals held that because the People failed to produce evidence to the contrary of the defendant’s allegations that the confession was coerced by means of physical and mental abuse, the People
failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, the defendant’s confession was excluded as involuntary.91 In Guilford, the
court reasoned that the People had failed to meet its burden because
doubt remained as to whether the influence of the wrongful interrogation remained in the mind of the defendant as he gave his confession.92
84

Id. at 206, 209.
364 N.E.2d 1318 (N.Y. 1977).
86
Id. at 1320.
87
Id. at 1321.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 1322.
90
286 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. 1972)
91
Id. at 256.
92
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206, 210; see People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1965)
(holding that before a confession may be submitted to the jury, the judge must determine its
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and that if the prosecutor desires to offer the confession as evidence at the trial, the defense should be provided notice; conversely, if the defense intends to contest the voluntariness of the confession was involuntary, notice shall be
given to the prosecutor so that a pre-trial Huntley hearing may be held on the matter).
85
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The court in Guilford appropriately held that the People did
not prove its burden beyond a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession.93 When taking into consideration
the totality of the circumstances, the eight hour break between the
end of the interrogation and the defendant’s confession was clearly
not a “pronounced break” that would allow for differentiation between the wrongful forty-nine and one-half hour interrogation and the
defendant’s confession eight hours later.94 The argument that the
presence of counsel and the timely administration of Miranda warnings are sufficient means to render the defendant’s confession voluntary is inadequate given that the defendant’s mind had already been
influenced by the time counsel arrived.95 Moreover, the mere presence of counsel is not enough to guarantee a defendant’s right against
self-incrimination, especially if counsel is not trusted by his client
and lacks important details of the situation.96 The court’s holding,
therefore, lends further support to preserving defendant’s rights
against self-incrimination.
V.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY

The self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment protects criminal suspects from official compulsion designed to compel
an incriminating statement that could be used against them.97 Beginning with the United States Supreme Court case Bram v. United
States,98 early American case law held that distinguishing whether a
confession was voluntary or involuntary was the test to determine its
admissibility into evidence.99 The Court found that statements used
to convict the defendant in Bram were attained by confusing the defendant rather than by the defendant’s own volition.100 Thus, the
Court held that the confession was involuntary and in violation of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment because the de93

Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 210.
Id. at 210.
95
Id. at 208.
96
Id.
97
U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating in pertinent part that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”).
98
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
99
Id. at 564.
100
Id. at 562 (stating that the witness could not have seen the defendant commit the crime
from the vantage point the witness claims to have been at).
94
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fendant had been compelled into being a witness against himself.101
Not all scholars agree that the foundation for the admissibility
of a confession is rooted in the concept of voluntariness found in the
Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause. One commentator disagreed with the proposition that the defendant’s volition should be
the test for admissibility of confessions and criticized the decision of
the Court in Bram in his article Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule.102 In this article, the author argued that the requirement for
voluntariness is not found in the self-incrimination clause.103 He
opined that a test based in voluntariness is unworkable due to the impossibility of accurately determining a defendant’s state of mind.104
Instead, the author advocated for a new workable test for identifying
compelled confessions on a case-by-case basis based on the conduct
of the interrogator.105 This test is based on the prohibition of compulsion found in the self-incrimination clause.106 The proposed test is an
“objective penalty” standard, which measures compulsion based on
whether an official has “impose[d] a penalty on a suspect to either
punish silence or provoke speech.”107 Currently, no such test has
been implemented by case law and, as such, the “objective penalty”
standard remains a novel take on determining the admissibility of a
confession.
The next major judicial development of the self-incrimination
clause came in the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona.108 In Miranda,
the Court found that when a suspect is taken into custody and questioned, he must be procedurally informed of his rights by way of a set
of prophylactic warnings; these procedural safeguards are now popularly known as Miranda warnings.109 This case illustrated a shift in
101

Id. at 564.
Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Towards A Workable
Test For Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 467, 515 (2005) (stating
in pertinent part that an objective measurement of compulsion rather than a subjective measurement of voluntariness is the proper test to determine the admissibility of a confession).
103
Id. at 471.
104
Id. at 468-69.
105
Id. at 515.
106
Id. at 538.
107
Godsey, supra note 102, at 515-16.
108
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
109
Id. at 479 (stating that the defendant has a “right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”).
102
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the Court’s emphasis in Bram from a test based solely on voluntariness to a test based on in part on voluntariness and compulsion when
considering the admissibility of a confession.110
Following the wake of Miranda, Congress passed Section
3501 in Title 18 of the United States Code.111 This statute concerned
the admissibility of confessions, but omitted any references to Miranda warnings as a means to determine admissibility.112 Instead, the
statute emphasized voluntariness alone, as opposed to compulsion, as
the deciding factor concerning the admissibility of a confession and
removed any aspect of compulsion from the analysis.113
The next major development in case law concerning the admissibility of a confession arose in 2000 in the United States Supreme Court case Dickerson v. United States.114 In this case, the
Court held that Miranda was constitutionally based and, thus, could
not be superseded by a legislative act.115 This decision effectively
overruled Section 3501, re-establishing Miranda warnings as a defendant’s primary safeguard against coaxed or coerced confessions.116
Therefore, the current applicable rule to determine the admissibility
of a confession could be summarized as being rooted in the selfincrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, which in turn is reinforced by the decision in Miranda and enforced in practice by the
administration of Miranda warnings to those in custody.
VI.

FEDERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The federal precedent leading up to this modern rule can be
highlighted by a number of significant United States Supreme Court
cases. With regard to physical coercion, the United States Supreme
Court decided, in Brown v. State of Mississippi,117 that no physical
coercion is permitted to elicit a defendant’s confession.118 In this
case, the only evidence against the defendants was their confes-

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Godsey, supra note 102, at 501.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2013).
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).
Id.
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
Id. at 444.
Id.
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Id. at 287.
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sions.119 Further, it was undisputed that these confessions were obtained after what could only be described as torture by the authorities.120 The Court’s rationale in this case was that these confessions
obtained by physical coercion could not be considered voluntary confessions.121
As to the mental state of the defendant, the United States Supreme Court quipped in the case United States v. Bayer122 that once
the defendant “let the cat out of the bag,” he could not get it back
in.123 This colorful comment pertains to the defendant’s mental state
after he has given an initial involuntary confession followed by a second confession which on its face seemed voluntary. The Court,
however, does not preclude the admission of a confession made by
the same defendant if his original “pre-confession” mental state had
been restored.124 In contrast to Guilford, the Court reasoned in Bayer
that the defendant’s second confession was voluntary and admissible
because the six month span of time between confessions was a sufficient length of time to restore the mindset of the defendant to its “preconfession” condition.125 The Court explained that any confession
given after the defendant’s “pre-confession” mental state had been
restored would have been given of the defendant’s own volition, not
as a result of any coercive actions on the part of authorities, and
would thus be admissible.126
The idea that a defendant should be restored to his “preconfession” condition is evident in the case Wong Sun v. United
States.127 Here, the United States Supreme Court found that a confession given by the defendant several days after his initial arrest was
admissible because the confession was not gained by exploiting the
illegal arrest but rather was given by the defendant out of his own volition.128 In this case, the Court opined that due to the lengthy break
in time, the connection of the confession to the wrongful interroga119

Id.
Id. at 281-82 (stating that the defendants, all African-American men, were either hung
until near death or whipped before their confessions were obtained).
121
Id. at 287.
122
Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
123
Id. at 540.
124
Id. at 540-41.
125
Id. at 541
126
Id. at 540-41.
127
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
128
Id. at 491.
120
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tion had “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” of the first
illegal arrest and questioning.129
Regarding the limitations of Miranda warnings, the United
States Supreme Court case New York v. Quarles130 created an exception to the practice that a Miranda warning must be administered.131
In Quarles, the Court held that Miranda warnings may be omitted by
an official before questioning a suspect if public safety is an immediate concern.132 In this case, the Court found that the officer’s query
as to the location of the defendant’s hidden gun was appropriate even
if formal Miranda warnings had not yet been administered because
there was still of an appreciable threat posed to the public via the unknown whereabouts of a firearm.133
A further limitation to Miranda was set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois.134 Here, the Court reasoned that Miranda warnings alone do not expunge the adverse effects of an illegal arrest and any subsequent confessions made.135 In
Brown, the Court found that when Miranda warnings had been administered but the voluntariness of a confession was still in doubt,
then it was appropriate to assess the totality of the circumstances to
determine admissibility on a case-by-case basis.136 Here, the Court
placed the burden of demonstrating voluntariness on the prosecution.137 In this case, the Court found that the defendant’s two confessions were results of his wrongful arrest, and because only two hours
had elapsed between his arrest and his first confession, the Court
ruled that there had not been enough time to expunge the adverse effects of the illegal arrest from his mind before he gave his second
confession.138
The federal approach to determining the admissibility of a defendant’s confession could thus be summarized as an assessment of
129
Id.; see also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (explaining that
where the connection between the confession and the wrongful act of obtaining it have become “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” then any confession given thereafter would be
deemed voluntarily given).
130
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
131
Id. at 653.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 652-53.
134
422 U.S. 590 (1975).
135
Id. at 603.
136
Id. at 603-04.
137
Id. at 604.
138
Id. at 604-05.
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the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession’s origins
taking specific notice of the presence of any physical coercion present in the interrogation and the mindset of the defendant while making said confession. If the defendant is found to still be under the influence of a wrongful arrest or questioning, then his confession will
be suppressed as being involuntary. This approach ensures that no
defendant is compelled to give evidence against himself and is in
harmony with the Fifth Amendment.
VII.

NEW YORK STATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The New York precedent leading up to Guilford is nearly
identical to federal precedent and can be highlighted through several
New York Court of Appeals decisions and Appellate Division cases.
In the state law cognate of Brown v. Mississippi, the New York Court
of Appeals case People v. Weiner139 held that confessions need to be
made voluntarily if they are to be considered admissible.140 In this
case, the defendant was threatened with physical force by police officers until a confession was obtained.141 In Weiner, the court reasoned that the defendant’s confession was made only out of fear of
physical threats and, thus, suppressed the confession as being involuntary.142
In another case, People v. Yukl,143 the Court of Appeals addressed the mindset of the defendant and decided that Miranda rights
could be waived voluntarily and, thus, any confession made thereafter was a voluntary confession.144 In Yukl, the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and began to cooperate with police in
the investigation of a murder.145 Through the defendant’s cooperation, the police were able to determine that he was the killer. 146 The
court explained that a reasonable person would have recognized that
he was in custody at the time; therefore, through his cooperation, the

139

161 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1928).
Id. at 443.
141
Id. at 442 (stating that the defendant was physically assaulted and threatened by officers before giving his confession).
142
Id. at 442-43.
143
256 N.E.2d 172 (N.Y. 1969).
144
Id. at 174, 175.
145
Id. at 172-73.
146
Id. at 173.
140
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defendant waived his Miranda rights.147
Like the federal courts, the New York courts follow the rationale that the “taint” of illegal arrest or illegal questioning may be
purged from the mind of the defendant, thus, allowing a voluntary
confession to be given. Illustrating this point is the Appellate Division, Fourth Department case People v. Strong.148 In Strong, the
court found in favor of the People after the defendant made his confession four hours after his illegal arrest and after two sets of Miranda warnings had been given.149 The court reasoned that there was a
sufficient amount of time between his illegal arrest and his confession
to “reset” his mind and render his confession voluntary; thus, the
statements were not “obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest.”150
A similar decision to Strong is the Appellate Division, Second
Department case People v. Alexander.151 Here, in contrast to the decision in Guilford, the court found that eleven hours was a sufficient
amount of time to purge the effects of the wrongful interrogation
from the mind of the defendant.152 This decision was based on the
fact that the defendant had been given his Miranda warnings in a
timely manner and had waived those rights prior to questioning.153
More importantly, the confession was given by the defendant to a
new detective about an unrelated subject eleven hours after his initial
arrest and after he had been shown surveillance video of himself
committing the crime.154
On the other hand, the Second Department found in People v.
Clark155 that the defendant’s confession was gained by means of exploiting his illegal arrest and, therefore, the confession given should
be suppressed.156 In Clark, the defendant was arrested without probable cause, interrogated, and given a polygraph test, which he
failed.157 After being informed of the results of the polygraph test,

147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 175.
794 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2005).
Id. at 258.
Id.
882 N.Y.S.2d 473 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009).
Id. at 475.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 475.
540 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1989).
Id. at 329-30.
Id. at 329.
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the defendant confessed.158 The court found that because it was unclear what procedures were used to elicit the confession, then the
confession must have been given involuntarily; the People failed to
meet their burden and demonstrate that the confession was given voluntarily.159 Another case supporting this point is People v. Pitsley.160
Here, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department explained that because there was no significant intervening event between the wrongful arrest and the defendant’s confession, the confession should be
excluded.161
Thus, the state approach to determining the admissibility of a
confession mirrors the federal approach. The New York approach
prohibits the admission of physically coerced confessions and takes
into account the totality of circumstances surrounding the making of
the confession. The court will analyze these factors in order to ensure that the confession was not given while the defendant was under
the influence of wrongful questioning or wrongful arrest thus ensuring that the confession was given voluntarily.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The court in Guilford correctly held that the defendant’s confession, on the morning of March 23, 2007, was a coerced confession
that was made involuntarily as a result of wrongful interrogation.162
The totality of the circumstances has shown that the defendant’s eight
hour break in Guilford was insufficient to remove the influence of his
wrongful interrogation from his mind.163 The court’s rejection of the
defendant’s confession comports with the spirit of the Fifth Amendment and the self-incrimination clause. In coming to its decision, the
court did not articulate a clear rule regarding when a defendant is restored to his former state of mind. In the future, the court could determine the admissibility of a confession based not on a voluntariness
standard but rather on an objective penalty standard.164 With that in
mind, each defendant’s case and circumstances are different. An in-

158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Id. at 330.
391 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1977).
Id. at 258.
Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 210.
Id.
Godsey, supra note 102, at 515-16.
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flexible rule would most likely prejudice those defendants who need
more time to readjust themselves from the effects of the interrogation. There is much at stake in confusing voluntary and involuntary
admissions and great care must be taken in differentiating them. By
accepting involuntary admissions, coerced by force or trickery, the
court not only jeopardizes the liberty of the defendant but compromises the integrity of the justice system as a whole. For that reason,
the standard for defining voluntariness with regard to confessions is
necessarily high, and justice is better served through the current trend
of assessing issues of voluntariness on a case-to-case basis.
Joseph A. Iemma
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